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Abstract
Global and national accountability for maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH) is increasingly
invoked as central to addressing preventable mortality and morbidity. Strategies of accountability
for MNCH include policy and budget tracking, maternal and perinatal death surveillance, perform-
ance targets and various forms of social accountability. However, little is known about how the
growing number of accountability strategies for MNCH is received by frontline actors, and how
they are integrated into the overall functioning of local health systems. We conducted a case study
of mechanisms of local accountability for MNCH in South Africa, involving a document review of
national policies, programme reports, and other literature directly or indirectly related to MNCH,
and in-depth research in one district. The latter included observations of accountability practices
(e.g. through routine meetings) and in-depth interviews with 37 purposely selected health manag-
ers and frontline health workers involved in MNCH. Data collection and analysis were guided by a
framework that defined accountability as answerability and action (both individual and collective),
addressing performance, financial and public accountability, and involving both formal and infor-
mal processes. Nineteen individual accountability mechanisms were identified, 10 directly and 9 in-
directly related to MNCH, most of which addressed performance accountability. Frontline manag-
ers and providers at local level are targeted by a web of multiple, formal accountability
mechanisms, which are sometimes synergistic but often duplicative, together giving rise to local
contexts of ‘accountability overloads’. These result in a tendency towards bureaucratic compliance,
demotivation, reduced efficiency and effectiveness, and limited space for innovation. The function-
ing of formal accountability mechanisms is shaped by local cultures and relationships, creating an
accountability ecosystem involving multiple actors and roles. There is a need to streamline formal
accountability mechanisms and consider the kinds of actions that build positive cultures of local
accountability.
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Introduction
Since the advent of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
there has been major global interest in furthering maternal, newborn
and child health (MNCH; United Nations General Assembly, 2015),
which is set to continue in the era of the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs; United Nations Secretary-General, 2010). Despite sig-
nificant achievements, preventable maternal, neonatal and child
mortality remains unacceptably high, particularly in low- and
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middle-income countries (United Nations Secretary-General, 2014;
WHO, 2018). The vast majority of deaths can be attributed to
health system failures often in the context of severe resource
constraints and poverty. These failures include, amongst others, in-
sufficient or inadequate distribution of healthcare facilities to ensure
coverage, the dearth of skilled health providers and ‘know-how’,
drug stock-outs, lack of essential life-saving equipment, and inad-
equate referral, emergency transport, and monitoring and supervi-
sion systems (Sundari, 1992; UN Millennium Project, 2005; Ross
and Mukumbuta, 2009; Mabaso et al., 2014).
In response to these system failures, the need for greater health
system ‘accountability’ is increasingly invoked as critical to address-
ing the ongoing problem of maternal, neonatal and child mortality
and morbidity, not only at global level (United Nations Secretary-
General, 2015), but also at national and local levels (Freedman and
Schaaf, 2013; Mafuta et al., 2015; Lodenstein et al., 2017;
Nxumalo et al., 2018a).
In a review of studies on accountability for MNCH in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Hilber et al. (2016) proposed that ‘accountability
exists when an individual or body, and the performance of tasks or
functions by that individual or body, are subject to another’s over-
sight, direction or request that they provide information or justifica-
tion for their actions’. According to Brinkerhoff (2003), drawing
from Schedler (1999), accountability encompasses two inter-related
key processes: answerability and enforceability. Answerability refers
to the obligation to inform about and explain actions or decisions
taken; while enforceability relates to the capacity to impose sanc-
tions (or apply remedial action) in case of violation of key mandates
(Schedler, 1999). Answerability and enforceability can operate at
the individual or the collective levels (Schedler, 1999). One common
way in which answerability is operationalized in health bureauc-
racies is by setting targets for performance (Roberts, 2009). These
targets are often associated with performance audits, and the use of
incentives and sanctions when targets are met or not, respectively.
Accountability in healthcare thus implies a contractual relationship
between providers and organizations that entails a certain level of
answerability and enforceability that would result in a certain level
of performance (Schedler, 1999).
Brinkerhoff further distinguishes between the following three types
of accountability in healthcare organizations: financial, performance
and political/democratic accountability (Box 1; Brinkerhoff, 2003,
2004). Formal accountability relationships can thus be either internal,
within the health management and bureaucracies (for instance, be-
tween peers, managers at various levels and health service providers
and district health managers); or external, between health providers
and the health beneficiaries or a community (Cleary et al., 2013;
Nxumalo et al., 2018a).
In practice, however, there are challenges in applying the ideal
type approaches to accountability described above. In the first in-
stance, they do not take into account the complexities underlying
the daily practices and the inherently relational nature of account-
ability (Moncrieffe, 2011; Halloran, 2015, 2016; Van Belle, 2016;
Nxumalo et al., 2018a). These complexities are referred to as an ‘ac-
countability ecosystem’, consisting of multiple actors with a range
of roles, responsibilities and interactions across levels of the system,
and embedded in micro-social and political contexts (Halloran,
2015; Van Belle et al., 2018). Accountability ecosystems include for-
mal and informal pathways and forces together grounded in a local
accountability ‘culture’ (Halloran, 2015).
Secondly, performance targets may become ends in themselves
rather than a means to improve performance (Roberts, 2009). Poor
performance may, in fact, emerge from a performance culture exces-
sively focusing on targets and not on the processes to get there, con-
tinuously defining new intervention targets, ignoring the importance
of human capital and relationships (Koppell, 2005).
Thirdly, in practice, multiple and often conflicting demands for
accountability are often imposed on frontline managers (Messner,
2009). These accountability overloads, coupled with increased
expectations from health system bureaucracies, often result in
reduced efficiency and responsiveness for patient care (Halachmi,
2014; Erickson et al., 2017; Nxumalo et al., 2018a). This phenom-
enon has been described by organizational theorist Koppell (2005)
as ‘Multiple Accountabilities Disorder’ (MAD). It can undermine
the effectiveness of an organization resulting in accountability losing
its significance and evolving into a culture of empty compliance
(Koppell, 2005).
Fourthly, there is an assumption of a one-way direction in formal
accountability mechanisms, upwards or outwards, whereas account-
ability is better framed as a two-way relationship, referred to as re-
ciprocal accountability (Elmore, 2006; Moncrieffe, 2011).
According to Elmore (2006), reciprocity implies that ‘for every unit
of performance I require of you, I owe you a unit of capacity to pro-
duce that result’. This infers that, in healthcare organizations, ac-
countability for performance requires investing in improving the
capacity of frontline professionals and in provision of resources and
equipment as a prerequisite. Yet, typically, accountability relation-
ships in healthcare organizations are experienced by frontline health
professionals as a one-way answerability (Radin, 2011; Nxumalo
et al., 2018b), involving sanctioning and punitive responses to prob-
lems, rather than a range of instruments encompassing both pro-
active and reactive, positive and negative, and individual and
collective approaches (Nxumalo et al., 2018a).
Provoked in part by the MDGs (South African National
Department of Health, 2016), a number of policies and strategies to
Key Messages
• Frontline health managers and providers are subject to multiple accountability processes designed nationally and prac-
ticed locally, in addition to locally emerging accountability mechanisms.
• There may be duplication, overlap, conflict or synergy among these multiple accountability mechanisms at local level,
which often involve the same groups of actors.
• Formal accountability mechanisms operate within local cultures of informal relationships, networks and underlying
norms, some of which may become formalized over time.
• The informal dimensions of the accountability ecosystem provide a significant backdrop to formal mechanisms and may
be key to understanding local variation in maternal, newborn and child health outcomes.
• A more holistic systems perspective to accountability is needed, rather than the current siloed approach of multiple indi-
vidual accountability mechanisms.
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address maternal, neonatal and child mortality have been intro-
duced in South Africa, many of which rely upon greater local ac-
countability. In this article, we review formal accountability
mechanisms and describe local accountability practices for MNCH
in one health district (Mpumalanga Province) of South Africa. We
begin by mapping and categorizing all formal accountability mecha-
nisms directly or indirectly addressing MNCH, locating these in an
evolving policy context. We then describe the ‘accountability ecosys-
tem’ of the study district, examining both the practices of formal ac-
countability and the informal accountability relationships observed
in one sub-district. Finally, we explore the implications of a
‘crowded’ local accountability ecosystem for strengthening local
practices of accountability for MNCH.
Methodology
Study design and case definition
We undertook an exploratory case study, with the case defined as
the accountability ecosystem for MNCH at local (district) level, con-
sisting of a range of direct and indirect formal accountability mecha-
nisms. The term ‘accountability mechanism’ refers generically to the
range of broad and specific accountability strategies, interventions
and instruments. Direct mechanisms are those whose prime target is
MNCH care; mechanisms that are linked to MNCH through other
processes are referred to as indirect accountability mechanisms.
Informal accountability relationships consist of social norms, behav-
iours and local cultures that shape collective responsibility and
actions towards MNCH outcomes, as well as the functioning of for-
mal mechanisms.
Study setting
South Africa is a middle-income country with a quasi-federal polit-
ical system consisting of the national sphere, 9 provincial govern-
ments and 52 health districts. South Africa has been regarded as a
poor performer with respect to maternal and child health outcomes.
On the eve of the MDGs, the maternal mortality ratio was 141 per
100 000 live births (Statistics South Africa, 2015b) and the under-
five child mortality rate was 40 per 1000 live births (Statistics South
Africa, 2015a). The organization and delivery of health services is a
competence under the provincial government. The empirical compo-
nent of this study was conducted in Gert Sibande District, one of
three districts of Mpumalanga Province, situated in the north-east of
South Africa. The district has a population of about 1.1 million,
with the vast majority (61%) living in rural areas (Massyn et al.,
2017). Gert Sibande was targeted by the National Department of
Health as one of the districts with high maternal and child mortality,
holding back the achievement of the national MDG targets. The
Box 1: Typology of accountability (Source: Brinkerhoff, 2004, 2003); Excerpts of reflective notes
• ‘Financial accountability’ refers to tracking and reporting on allocation, disbursement and utilization of financial resour-
ces using auditing, budgeting and accounting tools.
• ‘Performance accountability’ refers to demonstrating and accounting for performance in light of agreed-upon perform-
ance targets.
• ‘Public accountability (political/democratic)’ refers to procedures, and mechanisms that seek to ensure that government
delivers on promises, fulfils the public trust, aggregates and represents citizens’ interests, and responds to ongoing and
emerging societal needs and concerns.
Excerpt of reflective note 1
The extended management meeting took place in a family-like atmosphere in which all participants were given an op-
portunity to add any item to the suggested agenda before its adoption. It was a platform where the executive management
reported back to other (operational) managers on key strategic issues and information from the district and provincial
offices. The extended management meeting observed was 2.5 hours in duration and had fruitful, work-related discussions
that resulted in setting up key actions for the sub-district. Open discussion, distributed, collective accountability and delega-
tion of decision-making were evident throughout the meeting as a variety of senior managers took charge of specific items
and in the allocation of key actions. Despite the fact that all participants had equal opportunities for participation, some
members (especially from PHC services) were observed to be quiet, suggesting the existence of implicit hierarchies in the
district.
Excerpt of reflective note 2
The general staff meeting was a platform where all hospital staff, all disciplines and all levels came together to discuss
mostly operational issues and challenges. The meeting observed was attended by approximately 40 people and lasted 5
hours. It was chaired by the CEO who introduced the purpose of the meeting as strengthening individual relationships and
working together for the benefit of the community, invoking the slogan ‘. . .united we shall stand’. After presentation of the
suggested meeting agenda, seven additional items were added by the staff before adoption.
At this meeting staff presented their issues of satisfaction and complaints, requesting their direct unit managers or supervi-
sors to respond. The role and voice of the local trade union representatives was particularly notable in this meeting. On the
one hand, they provided a strong voice for more accountability from managers to staff members, in terms of ensuring
resources and skills for quality health service delivery, and from staff members to the community in terms of providing
quality services. On the other hand, they acted to contain anger of staff towards managers, with a union shop steward
actively mediating during an open discussion, when some managers/supervisors felt they were personally attacked, by
saying ‘intimidation is not allowed in the staff meeting’. The rules of participation were also regularly reiterated by the
Chair (CEO), stating ‘Everyone’s opinion is accepted in this house’; ‘we are discussing work-related matters, not personal
issues’. Participants collectively acknowledged the District EMS manager who had ‘come down’ to a sub-district meeting
to account and answer questions related to grading and uniforms of EMS staff.
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district was also 1 of the 11 selected sites to pilot the new National
Health Insurance (NHI) Strategy in 2012; and one of the four dis-
tricts to receive (in 2014) a health system strengthening and quality
improvement intervention to reduce maternal and child mortality,
involving a new accountability structure (referred to as the
Monitoring and Response Unit—MRU) and processes (real-time
death reporting). The district comprises 8 district hospitals, 1 re-
gional hospital and 76 primary healthcare facilities, distributed
among seven sub-districts.
Analytical framework
The health system is understood as a complex adaptive system
(Paina and Peters, 2012) in which accountability, as part of overall
health system governance, is identified as a key crosscutting prop-
erty of the system as a whole (Mikkelsen-Lopez et al., 2011). Within
this system, multiple actors engage through various accountability
relationships, which can be distinguished with respect to their
intended purpose, their form and the way they operate.
Based on their main purpose, formal accountability mechanisms
can be categorized into the following three main groups (Box 1):
performance accountability, financial accountability and public ac-
countability (Brinkerhoff, 2003, 2004). These formal mechanisms
are embedded in, and interact with, a complex system of informal
accountability relationships that enable or constrain the ability of
frontline managers and healthcare providers to accomplish their
daily tasks. The informal accountability processes are expressed
through collective, spontaneous and unofficial action, peer support
and communication in local health systems (Figure 1).
We approached accountability as encompassing the two interact-
ing dimensions of answerability and responsive actions (widening
the approach from a narrow focus on ‘sanction’), that can be
addressed at individual and/or collective levels (Schedler, 1999). The
resulting actions can be either pro-active (i.e. actions and planning
before and preventing the occurrence of an event), or reactive
through remedial action or strategies for redress (i.e. actions in
response to a situation that has already occurred).
Data collection
The study had two main components: a documentary review and an
in-depth study of one district, in which two sub-districts were pur-
posefully selected as embedded cases representing different levels of
buy-in to the District MRU, identified in a previous evaluation
by the authors (Schneider et al., 2017). We used the following
three methods of data collection: (1) document review of policy
documents, reports, programme descriptions, and published litera-
ture addressing accountability mechanisms directly or indirectly
related to MNCH at local (district) level in South Africa and the dis-
trict under study; (2) non-participant observation, most intensively
in one sub-district, in order to gain an understanding of the account-
ability ecosystem including its informal dimensions; and (3) in-depth
interviews with 37 health managers and frontline health workers
involved in MNCH activities, some of whom were also active in
local trade union structures.
Document review
A variety of sources were searched, including Google search engine,
the South African Government (www.gov.za) and the Department
of Health (www.health.gov.za and www.idealhealthfacility.org.za/)
websites, publications such as the annual South African Health
Review (www.hst.org.za) and PubMed. We limited the search to
South Africa and to health facility, sub-district, district and national
strategies (as opposed to global mechanisms), including terms such
as: mortality audit, clinic committee, Perinatal (or Child) Problem
Identification Program (PPIP or CHIP), District Clinical Specialist
Team (DCST), health facility norms and standards related to
MNCH, adverse event reporting, Ideal Clinic, district (sub-district
and health facility) planning and review. We also searched for peer-
reviewed papers and grey literature from non-governmental organi-
zations fostering accountability in South Africa. Additional relevant
literature was identified through the reference lists of documents.
Finally, we reviewed local documents and minutes of mortality
surveillance and response structures such as the MRU.
Non-participant observation
The first author spent 3 weeks in one of the two sub-districts
conducting field observation and interviews. During this period, the
researcher engaged in the actors’ daily activities (such as supervisory
visits, ward rounds), attended meetings and held informal conversa-
tions in the district office, first-level community health clinics
and district hospitals. The actors observed were senior district and
hospital managers, facility and hospital operational managers,
professional nurses, medical officers, allied health workers, facility
data managers, trade union representatives, receptionists and secur-
ity guards at the entrance gates. We observed both formal account-
ability processes (such as morbidity and mortality audits, staff
meetings) and empirical expressions of informal accountability
relationships, directly or indirectly related to MNCH (such as









Figure 1 Accountability framework for MNCH at local DHS.
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unions). Three clinics designated as ‘Ideal Clinics’ by a national ac-
creditation system requiring compliance to various standards were
visited, observing the organization of work and patient flow in order
to grasp the reality of primary healthcare facilities in the sub-
district. Finally, the researcher joined a home visit led by a social
worker and a dietitian.
This period of intensive observation in the first sub-district was
supplemented by observations of meetings in the second sub-district
as well as the district office. All in all, from April to July 2018, we
observed a total of 22 meetings in the district.
The observations were conducted mostly by the first author who
is familiar with the South African health system. The observations
were framed by the previous evaluation in the district, and by his
understanding of accountability. The day-to-day operations of the
local health system are conducted in English, and he was thus able
to follow conversations. Observations were guided by a piloted field
observation sheet (Supplementary Appendix SA1). Detailed notes
were taken (where appropriate) during observations, followed by re-
flective notes after the fieldwork and in subsequent debriefing proc-
esses with the research team.
In-depth interviews
Using an interview guide based on the study framework
(Supplementary Appendix SA2), we conducted 37 semi-structured,
in-depth, face-to-face interviews and one focus group discussion of
nine PHC facility managers. Key informants involved in MNCH
care were purposely selected for interviews. They included district
programme managers, members of the DCSTs, hospital CEOs, PHC
and hospital mid-level ‘operational’ managers, clinicians, emergency
service personnel, dietitians, members of community-based outreach
teams, trade union representatives and hospital board chairpersons.
Analysis
Based on the study framework, a data extraction form was designed
for the document review (Supplementary Appendix SA3), and a pol-
icy timeline of formal mechanisms was constructed. Interview
recordings were transcribed, observation and reflection notes com-
piled, both were coded using Atlas.ti version 8, and a thematic ana-
lysis conducted. Codes were developed using both a deductive
approach based on a preset list of themes and inductively where new
ideas were identified. Finally, the network of formal mechanisms
was mapped using VensimV
R
PLE software (Version 7.0).
Rigour, reflexivity and ethical considerations
Entry in the field was facilitated by our previous engagement in the
study setting, evaluating an intervention to reduce maternal and
child mortality. The topic of accountability emerged as a primary
issue of concern from this evaluation, facilitating agreement on the
study by the health authorities at various levels. We presented the
study protocol and distributed pamphlets summarizing the project
to a range of audiences during meetings and site visits at the district
office, the sub-districts and at facilities. This process allowed us to
establish clarity on our purpose, and trust and rapport with the po-
tential informants (Li, 2008).
Participant observation can face ethical challenges given the sen-
sitive nature of accountability as a research topic, potentially expos-
ing hidden realities (Li, 2008). The first week of field observation
was spent attending meetings and actively participating in different
discussions without imposing any judgement. This process facili-
tated breaking the perception of the researcher as an outsider com-
ing to ‘hold people accountable’, and reaffirming the purpose as
seeking to develop an understanding (Maanen, 2011). As a result,
some informants who seemed reluctant to talk during the first week
were subsequently prepared to be interviewed during the following
weeks.
Regular feedback and discussion on the findings were presented
to district and sub-district actors at follow-up meetings, ensuring ac-
curacy of processes observed. In these ways, the researchers sought
to minimize descriptive and interpretive biases.
This article is part of the first author’s PhD project that was
approved by the Biomedical Science Research Ethics Committee and
Provincial Health Research Committee. All interviews proceeded
with signed informed consent.
Results
This section begins by describing the evolving policy context for
MNCH in South Africa giving rise to local accountability mecha-
nisms for MNCH. Guided by the analytical framework (Figure 1),
we then describe the formal accountability mechanisms identified
through the review of the official documents and how the mecha-
nisms were reflected in local practices (or not). Furthermore, we
provide a conceptual map depicting the various relationships be-
tween the accountability mechanisms as observed in local practices.
We then report on what we were able to discern regarding the infor-
mal relationships and cultures of accountability at play in the ‘ac-
countability ecosystem’.
Policy context of accountability mechanisms for MNCH
in South Africa
Figure 2 presents the timeline of implementation of various policies
directly and indirectly impacting on MNCH. We delimited this
timeline from 1994 (installation of democratic government in South
Africa) through to the MDG endpoint (2015) and the subsequent
start of the SDG era in 2016 (United Nations Secretary-General,
2010, 2015).
In the immediate post-1994 period, national mortality review
committees and local audit tools and systems were established for
maternal, neonatal and child health (National Department of
Health, 1999, 2010, 2011a). This was followed by a relatively silent
period (2000–2009) regarding new policies or interventions address-
ing MNCH as the preoccupation with the HIV/AIDS epidemic took
centre stage. However, leading up to the end of the MDG period, a
succession of policies, plans and strategies, and associated account-
ability mechanisms emerged to address both the ongoing high ma-
ternal and child mortality rates, as well as the local health system
more generally. These policies and strategies include among others
the Strategic Plan for Maternal, Newborn, Child and Women’s
Health (MNCWH) and Nutrition, and the appointment of DCST
playing key roles in clinical governance, clinical mentorship and
oversight.
Formal accountability mechanisms for MNCH
Table 1 provides a summary of the 19 formal accountability mecha-
nisms identified through the document review. Nine of them were
directly related to MNCH, mostly focusing on mortality auditing,
including three mechanisms [Perinatal Problem Identification
Programme (PPIP), Child Problem Identification Program (CHIP)
and Confidential Enquiry Into Maternal Deaths] that have a special
focus on continuously reviewing maternal, perinatal and childhood
deaths in South Africa. An additional nationally designed mortality
reporting and response mechanism, referred to as the MRU was also
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being piloted in the study district. Seven indirect mechanisms fos-
tered accountability for MNCH through their effects on overall
health system functioning. They included quality auditing and im-
provement through periodic reviews and accreditation process, and
a performance management system.
In practice, the following were the dominant mechanisms
observed: the mortality and morbidity review meetings such as the
perinatal (PPIP) and child mortality (CHIP), the MRU, the
Confidential Enquiry into Maternal Death (CEMD), the Ideal Clinic
process and the system of Periodic (quarterly) Reviews based on the
data from the routine District Health Information System (DHIS).
Perinatal meetings typically took place monthly and brought to-
gether clinical stakeholders from hospitals and primary healthcare
facilities. Monthly meetings for child mortality reviews (CHIP) took
place concomitantly with the perinatal meetings but focused on
under-five mortality and morbidity. These meetings allowed for the
identification of gaps in clinical knowledge and skills, and response
through in-service training such as the Essential Steps in the
Management of Obstetric Emergencies (ESMOE) ‘drills’.
The MRU convened at sub-district and at district level and
brought together a multidisciplinary team of stakeholders, including
managers (PHC, hospital, community), clinicians, information offi-
cers and other sectors (such as the Social Security Agency of South
Africa), NGOs, partners and community representatives to address
maternal and child health. The MRU followed the ‘4R’s’ approach
i.e. ‘Report, Review, Record, Respond’ to an event of maternal or
child death. The key feature of the MRU was the focus on respon-
siveness entailing pro-active actions to address the modifiable
factors through teamwork and skills building, and preventive action
through the primary healthcare system.
In the event of maternal death, a report was submitted to the dis-
trict office within 24 hours with the provisional cause of death.
Within 48 hours, the DCST together with the hospital stakeholders
met to audit and review the patient file, and identify and record the
causes of death with a final diagnosis, as well as any modifiable fac-
tors. The process ended with the setting up of an adverse event pro-
cess (mandated by an additional mechanism, the Office of Health
Standards Compliance) and a formulation of an improvement plan
for skills upgrading, provision of extra resources, or community en-
gagement as a response to the adverse event.
At the time of our fieldwork, following a rising concern with
poor performance of the HIV/TB programmes, a new mechanism
namely the ‘Nerve Centre’ was established to monitor and ensure
compliance with guidelines and targets set for HIV and TB treat-
ment. Attending the Nerve Centre were the primary healthcare man-
agers, nursing managers from hospitals, and the district co-
ordinators for MNCH, Prevention of Vertical Transmission (PVT)
and Quality Assurance. The Nerve Centre met weekly at facility
(Friday) and at sub-district levels (Monday), in addition to the estab-
lished Comprehensive Care, Management and Treatment of HIV/
AIDS and the Prevention of Vertical Transmission (CCMT/PVT)
cluster meetings that were taking place monthly at sub-district level.
Some of the mechanisms identified were explicitly designed as
strategies and tools to reinforce accountability with linkages to other
accountability mechanisms. For instance, the information and data
review meetings at facility and sub-district levels were linked to
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Figure 2 Timeline of national policies directly and indirectly related to MNCH.
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many other mechanisms fostering compliance with performance tar-
gets. In particular, the DHIS formed the basis of many other meet-
ings, as well as the system of performance targets and periodic
performance reviews (National Department of Health, 2011b).
Another was the Office of Health Standards Compliance
(OHSC), established to enforce compliance with health standards as
well as to ensure necessary investigation and action regarding com-
plaints related to healthcare. In addition to the OHSC was the ‘Ideal
Clinic’, a primary healthcare accreditation strategy whose essence
was to improve the quality of health services delivery at local level,
integrating compliance with a range of health provision standards
(‘upward’ accountability), with a process of complaints management
for improved quality health service delivery to communities (‘out-
ward’ accountability) (National Department of Health, 2017). For a
clinic to reach the status of Ideal Clinic, it must comply with a cer-
tain number of core standards covering administration, clinical serv-
ices management, pharmaceutical services, human resources,
infrastructure, or health information and communication (National
Department of Health, 2016). The Ideal Clinic accreditation process
integrates data from a number of sources, including its own audit
tools, the DHIS and complaints mechanisms.
Thirteen of the 19 accountability mechanisms identified
(Table 1) were principally oriented towards performance account-
ability with a strong emphasis on a reactive approach through
audits, accreditation and quality assurance. Proactive mechanisms
included the MRU, which was oriented towards preventive action,
clinical governance, training and improvement cycles. Only one
mechanism targeted financial accountability (periodic budget
reviews), possibly because of the narrow financial decision space at
this level. Three mechanisms were specifically related to public par-
ticipation and accountability mandated by the National Health Act
(NHA). They included the District Health Councils involving polit-
ical representatives across spheres of government and structures of
community participation such as Clinic Committees and Hospital
Boards.
Informal accountability relationships
In the sub-district observed more intensively, a number of instances
of informal accountability were identified, often in parallel to the
formal accountability mechanisms. For example, we observed a par-
ent telephoning a Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for
Health (Health Minister in the Provincial Government) to complain
about the poor quality of child health services in relation to the
treatment of his child. The open-door policy of a hospital CEO
allowed trade union representatives to walk in unannounced to
complain or get feedback regarding lack of equipment or resources,
or discuss any issue pertaining to the union members in the staff.
There were instances where the hospital board chairperson was
stopped on the road by community members to complain or to get
feedback on health-related issues.
In addition to these, we observed a number of instances involv-
ing both professional and administrative staff, which illustrated the
nature of informal accountability relationships at play in the sub-
district.
The first two examples relate to two meeting structures in the
sub-district, convened by the hospital CEO to develop relationships
and create a local culture of co-operation and trust between the ex-
ecutive management, the operational managers and the general staff
within facilities and across levels of care. They were (1) an Extended
Management Meeting involving 27 managers from hospital, PHC
facilities and trade union representatives that met monthly (Box 1:
Excerpt of reflective note 1) and (2) The General Staff Meeting, that
met four times a year and where the trade union was a central player
(Box 1: Excerpt of reflective note 2).
These participatory mechanisms were playing a key role in fos-
tering a system of reciprocal accountability in this sub-district. In
this instance, the trade union was an important broker, pushing
their members to comply with the rules for delivering quality serv-
ices, while continually engaging with the executive managers hold-
ing them accountable for the provision of resources and skills. The
negotiations involving trade unions were related to operational and
staffing issues, complex issues not necessarily under the immediate
control of local managers. The interventions by trade unions coun-
terbalanced the ongoing requests for more performance that pro-
viders were subjected to, despite a chronic shortage of staff and
resources.
There is an impact. . . it’s difficult to point at one another because
we create a centre of accountability . . .And when we raise our
issues, like issues of recruitment, the shortage of staff, like now
they do replace [staff or equipment] in time when you [the trade
union representative] hold the executive to be accountable.
Replacement of posts, and in terms of the equipment the hospital
must be well equipped (KII, Trade Union Shop Steward).
However, the interactions were not necessarily always smooth:
. . .[As trade union] You must be ready to confront difficult ques-
tions. You know when you’re confronted with difficult questions
it’s where you touch the heart of the person. . . You must be ready
[for the risk] of being hated. I like a person when he’s hating me
based on the truth not based on lies. Because I make sure I hold
the executive to be accountable for the interest of workers (KII
Trade Union Shop Steward).
The third example illustrates the informal side of a formal ac-
countability mechanism that was observed in the implementation of
the Ideal Clinics where the mid-level operational managers had
developed a set of informal collaborative arrangements for mutual
support during accreditation processes. For instance, elements from
the Ideal Clinic manual assessed the consistent availability of essen-
tial PHC medicines. If an essential medicine was missing in clinic A
due to a delay with supply, it could be borrowed from clinic B or
hospital C where it was available, not only to make sure that
patients received their medications but also when assessors were vis-
iting the clinic for auditing and rating.
According to (formal) regulations, any stockout must be
declared to the district/province unit and the facility must then
wait for the next delivery of supplies to issue medication again to
patients. During the wait, patients may not receive medication in
time, which means that the facility is in breach of service delivery
guidelines regarding treatment continuity. Through informal sys-
tems of peer support and solidarity, providers thus prioritized clin-
ical accountability to patients. It could also be seen as a form of
compliance to conform to national priorities through a local cop-
ing mechanism.
All these cases illustrate how building informal relationships of
trust can be influenced by reciprocal mechanisms, in turn shaping
the informal environment within the accountability ecosystem.
The crowded space of local MNCH accountability
Figure 3 maps the direct and indirect formal MNCH accountability
mechanisms and their relationships that we observed in local
practice. This illustrates performance accountability (Hexagon
shape) as the dominant mode of local accountability, while there
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is a relatively little emphasis on public accountability (triangle
shape) expressed mainly through Hospital Boards and Clinic
Committees (where the chairperson was a community representa-
tive), and in the complaints mechanisms in which clients are encour-
aged to submit any complaint or compliment using SMS messaging
system (MomConnect), or in writing through complaints boxes
found in all health facilities. The different mechanisms are intercon-
nected in their respective purposes. The resulting effect is that, in
practice, the same actors are involved in multiple sets of account-
ability mechanisms. For instance, in one sub-district, there were 258
meetings scheduled in the annual calendar associated with account-
ability mechanisms at facility, sub-district, district and/or provincial
level (average of 22 meetings per month). Table 2 shows the mul-
tiple meetings where frontline managers and providers have to ac-
count either in the form of submitting a report or receiving
feedback. In our observations, it could happen that two or more im-
portant meetings were scheduled on the same day and time which
involved the same managers (or providers). They, therefore, had to
choose which one to attend. And because the manager was absent in
one of the meetings, information related to her/his participation was
not reported, nor was there any feedback given, with potential
implications for the continuity and functioning of the system.
Last week we saw the in-charge of all the PHCs, she was saying
that there are a lot of meetings you know, sometimes they are
coming here, in the clinics there is shortage [of staff], that’s why
in some of the meetings we are not going to release them, maybe
one will come and after then the one who’s attending will come
and give feedback to the others. Sometimes feedback is fine but
sometimes you need to listen by yourself, to ask questions so that
you can improve. So that is really our problem (KI, Medical
Manager).
The density of the Figure 3 is an indication of the complex and
crowded nature of accountability mechanisms related to MNCH at
local level and its fragmented nature. At the operational level, this
boils down to an abundance of meetings involving managers.
It is a lot of meetings. . . Even outside we have a lot of meetings
also. There’s a schedule of meetings, monthly. Twelve to fifteen
meetings within the institution. . . So most of the time I’m outside
and inside for the meetings (KII, EMS Manager).
Interview data suggest that a shortage of frontline healthcare
providers, coupled with higher demand for more accountability
from a large number of vertical programme managers, can lead to
frustration and a dysfunctional accountability system for MNCH:
. . .They will tell you that we are having a lot on our plate. Next
time they want this from Ideal Clinic, next time they want this
from National Core Standards, next time they want this from
Nutrition; and who is the accounting officer. . . It will be the op-
erational manager who has to be Jack of All Trades. So, we are
having gaps because of staff shortage (KII, Manager District
Office)
Frontline managers also complained against the expectations of
accountability from multiple higher-level managers (at the district or
Provincial department of health).
. . .It’s not good to have a lot of managers than the actual pro-
viders, because if we are having a line of managers of 10 or 20,
. . ., but we are only having 5 people down there to work, I don’t
see it being working (KII, Operational Manager).
. . .How can you hold a person accountable if he is. . . she is alone,
looking after four units, admission, labour ward, antenatal and
postnatal department (KII, Operational Manager).
A branch of the national advocacy organization, the Treatment
Action Campaign (TAC) was also active in the District, implement-
ing a community monitoring and advocacy programme. The TAC
aims to build capacity for local activism, participating in setting up
local governance structures (clinic committees and hospital boards),
engaging the public to take ownership of the health system, monitor-
ing and raising concerns regarding the quality of health services pro-
vided, and ensuring accountability at local level. As they indicate,
‘We believe that with well-informed and rights-based local activism
we can create accountability at the frontline of healthcare service de-
livery which will, in turn, lead to better quality healthcare services’
(https://tac.org.za/).
Discussion
Frontline health managers and providers are targeted by a plethora
of accountability mechanisms addressing MNCH both directly and
indirectly. While some mechanisms, such as perinatal audits have a
long history, many of the direct MNCH mechanisms were designed
and implemented during the MDG ‘Countdown’ period as a way of
meeting targets related to the reduction of maternal and child mor-
tality. The MNCH mechanisms exist alongside a range of indirect
mechanisms involving district and frontline managers, resulting in
the multiplication of accountability initiatives at the local level.
These multiple accountability mechanisms are not mutually ex-
clusive in their mandates (Van Belle et al., 2018) and are sometimes
prone to conflicting demands especially in terms of the numbers of
meetings. This process is described by Gilson and Daire (2011) as an
Table 2 Meeting and reporting demands of frontline managers and
providers
Meetings Frequency Hospital PHC facility
Adverse Events meeting Monthly x x
All Nurses meeting Bimonthly x x
Budget Review Monthly x
CCMT/PCV, Health and Safety Monthly x x
Clinic Committees Monthly x
Clinical Audit Monthly x
Data/Information Review Monthly x x
Disaster Management (Hospital/
Clinics/Police/Fire/Community)
On request x x
District and Province meetings On request x
Doctors meeting Weekly x
ESMOE Drills Monthly x x
Executive Management Monthly x
Extended Management Monthly x x
General staff meeting Quarterly x
Hospital Boards Quarterly x
Medical and Allied Health Monthly x x
Mortality and Morbidity Monthly x x
MRU (District) Monthly x
MRU (Sub-district) Monthly x x
Nerve Centre Weekly x x
Nursing and Health Professions
Councils (SANCA/HPCSA)
On request x x
Operational Managers meeting Monthly x x
Perinatal (PPIP/CHIP) Monthly x x
PHC Meetings Monthly x x
PMDS Quarterly Reviews Quarterly x x
Quality Assurance Monthly x x
Sub-district Information Team Monthly x x
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‘inverted pyramid’ where frontline managers and providers face a
‘top heavy and rigid management hierarchy’ reinforced by top-down
vertical programmes. As pointed out by Nxumalo et al. (2018a), the
conflicting demands for accountability may push frontline managers
to prioritize and make selective choices with potentially negative
implications for health service efficiency, effectiveness and respon-
siveness. Referring to ‘Multiple Accountabilities Disorder (MAD)’,
Koppell (2005) argued that multiple demands for accountability
with conflicting expectations imposed on the actors within an or-
ganization result in a dysfunctional system that tends to shift the
core of accountability to performance compliance. Halachmi (2014)
referred to ‘accountability overloads’ that result from unco-ordi-
nated efforts to ensure accountability at all costs which end up
undermining effectiveness and efficiency.
The emphasis of accountability initiatives was on performance ra-
ther than other forms of accountability, mostly conducted in the form
of audit processes. These typically target individual level answerabil-
ity and sanctioning rather than seeking to develop a pro-active and
wider collective organizational or even, ecosystem response. This was
most evident in the individual performance management development
system, the quality assessment and accreditation processes, the quar-
terly reviews, and in the ‘adverse event’ responses. While there were
exceptions (such as in some mortality audit processes and the MRU),
the dominant mode of accountability was one of the seeking compli-
ance with standards and progress towards achieving targets through
multiple lines of answerability.
Typically autocratic managerial approaches to performance as-
sessment do little to build the management skills of frontline manag-
ers (Nxumalo et al., 2018b). The consequence of a culture of
compliance is a disconnect with the real purposes of accountability.
One such instance observed was that of the Ideal Clinic. As an ex-
ample of its implementation in practice attests, audit systems can
easily lead to a form of compliance, decoupled from their true pur-
pose. This occurs when frontline workers are forced to meet mul-
tiple demands for answerability from above. As noted by Roberts
(2009), this kind of ‘transparency’ can become a representation of
performance that is manufactured for others, rather than actual
performance.
In the plethora of accountability processes, we found relatively
little space for public accountability. This was expressed mainly
through Hospital Boards and Clinic Committees, and in the com-
plaints mechanisms. Hospital Boards and Clinic Committees, which
include community representatives as chairpersons, are mostly
involved in complaints management and redress processes; they also
hold public meetings to receive and share views regarding the health
problems in the community. However, the governance role of clinic
committees tends to be limited to conflict resolution between the
community and the health facilities with few other oversight roles in
health facilities (Padarath and Friedman, 2008).
In the sub-district studied, trades unions played an important
role in advocating not only for more outward accountability, but
also for fairness, transparency and provision of resources for quality
health services. This generally positive role was made possible by
structures of participation and dialogue introduced by the ward
councillor and the sub-district leadership. This experience was in
contrast to what was described in the earlier evaluation (Schneider
et al., 2017) regarding the role of trade unions, where they were per-
ceived by some as disruptive and as expressing narrow interests.
While the formal accountability mechanisms are well described
in the official documents, in practice these formal mechanisms are
embedded in a context of local cultures of informal accountability
that vary from one sub-district to another. These informal
mechanisms are expressed through meeting processes and social
interactions (spontaneous and reciprocal), informal relationships
and emergent managerial strategies observed locally. The instances
provided illustrate the functioning of accountability mechanisms,
and the central role of relational capabilities in fostering account-
ability for MNCH.
It may be difficult to establish the causal effect of the informal
dimensions of the accountability ecosystem. However, when
formal mechanisms were embedded in informal norms, culture or
relationships where providers and managers were able to engage
fruitfully in negotiated spaces, these appeared to enable the success
of the formal mechanism. This was achieved by creating the possi-
bility of reciprocal accountability (Elmore, 2006) within vertical
accountability relationships, and enabling horizontal forms of col-
laboration between managers. These phenomena may be key to
understanding variation in MNCH outcomes between local areas.
Conclusion
In this article, we explored accountability mechanisms for MNCH at
district level in South Africa. Frontline health managers and health-
care providers are subject to a plethora of accountability mechanisms.
In some instances, there is duplication or overlap in these mecha-
nisms, whereas in others there are potential synergies. In practice, for-
mal accountability strategies are embedded in a web of informal
relationships and norms that are rooted in daily routines. These infor-
mal mechanisms are operationalized in various ways depending on
the managerial approach and local context in which accountability is
exercised. In the growth of accountability strategies, emphasis has
been on performance accountability and an auditing style of account-
ability. In order to improve maternal and child health outcomes and
reduce mortality, a systematic understanding of local practices of ac-
countability is required, seeking to enable context specificity, develop-
ing synergies in mechanisms while also actively engaging the informal
accountability norms. This process should consider the multiple
actors and relationships across various levels within the local health
system with the formal accountability mechanisms being practiced in
order to build a functioning accountability ecosystem.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at Health Policy and Planning online
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